



We might ask two questions about the relation between trust and the will. One ques-
tion, about trust, is whether you can trust “at will.” Say there is someone whom you
would like to trust but whose worthiness of your trust is not supported by available
evidence. Can you trust despite acknowledging that you lack evidence of the trustee’s
worthiness of your trust? Another question, about the will, is whether you can exercise
your will at all without trusting at least yourself. In practical agency, you act by
choosing or intending in accordance with your practical judgment. Self-trust may seem
trivial in a split-second case, but when the case unfolds through time – you judge that
you ought to φ, retain your intention to φ through an interval, and only at the end of
that interval act on the intention – your self-trust spans a shift in perspectives that
mimics a relation between different people. Here too we may ask whether you can trust
“at will.” Can you enter “at will” into the self-relation that shapes this diachronic
exercise of your will? What if your earlier self does not appear to be worthy of your
trust? If you cannot trust at will, does that entail – perhaps paradoxically – that you
cannot exercise your will “at will”?1
In this chapter, I explore the role of the will in trust by exploring the role of trust in the
will. You can trust at will, I argue, because the role of trust in the will assigns an
important role to trusting at will. Trust plays its role in the will through a contrast
between trust in your practical judgment and a self-alienated stance wherein you rely on
your judgment only through an appreciation of evidence that it is reliable. When you
have such evidence, as you often do, you can choose to trust yourself as an alternative to
being thus self-alienated. When you lack such evidence, as you sometimes do, you can
likewise choose to trust, provided you also lack significant evidence that your judgment is
not reliable. In each case, you exercise your will by trusting at will. You regulate your
trust, not through responsiveness to positive evidence of your judgment’s reliability, but
through responsiveness to possible evidence of your judgment’s unreliability: if you come
to have significant evidence that your judgment is not reliable, you will cease to trust, and
(counterfactually) if you had had such evidence you would not have trusted.2
The key to my approach lies in distinguishing these two ways of being responsive to
evidence. On the one hand, you cannot trust someone – whether another person or
your own earlier self – whom you judge unworthy of your trust. Though you can for
other reasons rely on a person whom you judge untrustworthy, it would be a mistake to
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describe such reliance as “trust.” On the other hand, trust does not require a positive
assessment of trustworthiness. When you trust, you are responsive to possible evidence
that the trustee is unworthy of your trust, and that responsiveness – your disposition to
withhold trust when you encounter what you assess as good evidence that the trustee is
unworthy of it – makes trust importantly different from a “leap of faith.” You may lack
sufficient evidence for the judgment that your trustee is worthy of your trust, but that
evidential deficit need not constrain your ability to trust. Even if you have such evi-
dence, that evidence should not form the basis of your trust.
I thus take issue with Pamela Hieronymi’s influential analysis of trust as a “com-
mitment-constituted attitude.”3 Your trust is indeed constrained by your responsive-
ness to evidence of untrustworthiness. But you need not undertake an attitudinal
commitment to the trustee’s worthiness of your trust: you need undertake no com-
mitment akin to or involving a judgment that the trustee is trustworthy. An attitu-
dinal commitment to a person’s worthiness of your trust creates normative tension
with your simply trusting her. If you judge that she is worthy of your trust, you need
not trust her; you can rely, not directly on her in the way of trust, but on your own
judgment that she will prove reliable. That sounds paradoxical. Are you thereby pre-
vented from trusting those whom you deem most worthy of your trust? There is no
paradox; there is merely a need to understand how we trust at will. A volitional ele-
ment in trust enables you to enforce this distinction, trusting instead of merely relying
on your judgment that the trustee is reliable.
Since the contrast between these two possibilities is clearest in intrapersonal trust, I
make that my focus, thereby treating the question of “trust and will” as probing both
the role of the will in trust and the role of trust in the will. We can see why trust is not
a commitment-constituted attitude by seeing how trust itself plays a key role in the
constitution of a commitment. In order to commit yourself to φing at t, you have to
expect that your future self will at t have a rational basis for following through on the
commitment not merely in a spirit of self-reliance but also, and crucially, in the spirit of
self-trust.
11.1 Why Care about Trusting at Will?
What then is it to form a commitment? And how might it matter that the self-trust at
the core of a commitment be voluntary? We can see how it might matter by considering
the alternative. Say you intend to φ at t but just before t learn that context makes it
imperative that you either assess your intending self as trustworthy before you act on
the intention or redeliberate whether to φ from scratch. Imagine that it is too compli-
cated to redeliberate from scratch but that materials for assessing your trustworthiness
are available in the form of evidence that you were indeed reliable in making the
judgment that informs your intention. If you proceed to act on that judgment, having
made this assessment, you do not simply trust your judgment. Without that trust, your
judgment that you ought to φ does not inform your intention to φ in the normal way.
You are not simply trusting your judgment if you require evidence that it is reliable.
To say that you simply trust your judgment that you ought to φ is to say that you
reason from it by, e.g. forming an intention to φ, or act on it by φing, without explicitly
redeliberating. When you follow through on your intention to φ without redeliberating,
your follow-through is not mediated by an assessment or reassessment of the self that
judged that you ought to φ. There is, of course, the problem that you cannot keep
assessing yourself – assessing your judgment that you ought to φ, assessing that
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judgment, then that judgment, ad infinitum (or however high in this hierarchy you are
able to formulate a thought). But my present point is different: there is an important
contrast between (i) the common case in which you trust your judgment that you ought
to φ by forming an intention to φ and then following through on that intention and (ii)
the less common but perfectly possible case in which you feel a need to assess your
judging or intending self for trustworthiness before feeling rationally entitled to follow
through on it.
That distinction, between trusting yourself and relying on yourself through an
assessment of your reliability, marks an important difference between two species of
self-relation. The difference is functional, a matter of how the two stances ramify more
broadly through your life. Do you second-guess yourself – forming a practical judg-
ment or intention but then wondering how trustworthy that judgment or intention
really is? In some regions of your life such self-mistrust may be perfectly appropriate –
when you are learning a new skill or when a lot is at stake. But in the normal course of
life you must exercise this virtue of temperance: to intend in a way that is worthy of
your trust, and to act on that intention unless there is good evidence that you are not
worthy of that trust. When there is no significant evidence of your untrustworthiness in
intending, or any good reason to believe that circumstances have changed in relevant
ways since you formed the intention, then you should trust yourself and follow
through. Evidence of your own untrustworthiness constrains your capacity to trust
yourself. But in the absence of such evidence you may avoid self-alienation by exercis-
ing your discretion to trust yourself at will.
In what respects is it “self-alienating” to rely on your responsiveness to evidence of
your reliability instead of trusting yourself ? One respect is simply that doing so does
not amount to making a decision or choice, or to forming an intention. But why care
about those concepts? What would you lose if you governed yourself without “making
choices” or “forming intentions” but instead simply by monitoring the reliability of
your beliefs about your practical reasons? One problem is that your beliefs about your
reasons may pull you in incompatible directions, so you need the capacity to settle what
to do by forming the “practical judgment” that you have conclusive or sufficient reason
to do A, even though you may also believe you have good reasons to do incompatible
B.4 Another problem is that, because you have limited evidence about the reliability of
your practical judgments, you will be unable to govern your reactions to novel issues.
But what does either problem have to do with “self-alienation”? The threat of self-
alienation marks the more general datum that our concepts of choice and intention
enable us to govern ourselves even when we lack evidence that our beliefs about our
reasons are reliable. Instead of responding to evidence of your reliability, your choice or
intention manifests responsiveness to the normative dynamic of a self-trust relation.
What is that normative dynamic? And how does your responsiveness to it ensure that
you are not self-alienated? We can grasp the distinctive element in self-trust by grasping
how the distinctive element in trust lies in what it adds to mere self-reliance. In any
form of reliance, including trust, you risk disappointment: the trustee may not do what
you are relying on her to do.5 But in trust, beyond mere reliance, you also risk
betrayal – in the intrapersonal instance, self-betrayal.6 We can understand the precise
respect in which self-trust embodies the antidote to self-alienation by grasping how the
risk of betrayal shapes the normative dynamic of a trust relation.
How exactly does trust risk betrayal? Annette Baier set terms for subsequent debate
when she argued that the risk of betrayed trust is distinctively moral. What is most
fundamentally at stake in a trust relation, Baier argued (1994:137), is not simply
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whether the trustee will do what you trust her to do – on pain of disappointing your
trust – but whether she thereby manifests proper concern for your welfare. I agree with
Baier’s critics that her approach over-moralizes trust.7 But these critics link their worry
about moralism with a claim that I reject: that the risk of betrayal adds nothing, as
such, to the risk of disappointment. Baier is right to characterize the distinctive risk of
trust as a form of betrayal, but the assurance that invites trust targets the trustor’s
rationality, not the trustor’s welfare or any other distinctively moral status. I do not
emphasize rationality to the exclusion of morality; I claim merely that the rational
obligation is more fundamental: while it does not follow from how trust risks betrayal
that trust is a moral relation, it does follow from how trust risks betrayal that trust is a
rational relation.
I elsewhere defend that claim about interpersonal trust (see also Potter, this volume),
arguing that the assurance at the core of testimony, advice or a promise trades on the
risk of betrayal (Hinchman 2017; see also Faulkner, this volume). I review that argument
briefly in section 11.4 below. In the next two sections I extend my argument to intra-
personal trust. To the objection that an emphasis on self-betrayal over-moralizes our self-
relations, I reply that this species of betrayal is rational – not, as such, moral. To put my
thesis in a single complex sentence: you betray yourself when, in undertaking a practical
commitment, you represent yourself as a source of rational authority for your own future
self without manifesting the species of concern for your future self ’s needs that would
provide a rational basis for that authority. Such betrayed self-trust shapes the self-rela-
tions at the core of diachronic agency – of your forming and then later following through
on an intention – by serving as a criterion of normative failure. The prospect of self-
betrayal reveals how trust informs your will: when you exercise your will by forming an
intention, you aim not to influence yourself in a self-alienated manner, through evidence
of your reliability, as if your later self were a different person, but to guide yourself
through trust, by putting yourself in position to treat your worthiness of that trust as
itself the rational basis of that guidance. Trust could not thus inform your will if you
could not trust at will, thereby willing a risk of self-betrayal.
11.2 How Betrayed Self-Trust Differs from Disappointed Self-Trust
How then does betraying your own trust differ from disappointing it? And how does
the possibility of self-betrayal figure in the exercise of your will? When you form an
intention, you institute a complex self-relation: you aim that you will follow through
on the intention through trust in the earlier self that formed it. Such projected self-
trust rests on a rational capacity at the core of trust: your counterfactual sensitivity to
evidence of untrustworthiness in the trustee. Within this projection, if there is evi-
dence that your earlier self is unworthy of your trust, you will not trust it, and if there
had been such evidence, you would not have trusted it. Our question is what that
sensitivity is a sensitivity to: what is it to be thus unworthy of trust? My thesis is that
you are on guard against the prospect of betrayed, not of disappointed, self-trust. In
a typical case of self-trust, as in a typical case of trust, you run both risks at once and
interrelatedly. But we can learn something about the nature of each by seeing how
they might come apart – in particular, how you might betray your self-trust without
disappointing it.
First consider a general question about the relation between disappointed trust
and betrayed trust. If A trusts B to φ, can B betray A’s trust in her to φ without
thereby disappointing that trust? If A’s trust in B to φ amounts to something more
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than her merely relying on B to φ, then we can see how B might betray A’s trust
even though she φs and so does not disappoint it. Perhaps B φs only because
someone – perhaps A himself – coerces her into φing. Or perhaps B φs with no
memory of A’s trust in her and with a firm disposition not to φ were she to remem-
ber it. In either case, B betrays A’s trust in her to φ, though she does φ and in that
respect does not disappoint A’s trust – even if A finds it “disappointing” (in a
broader sense) that his trust has been betrayed. We are investigating the distinction
specifically in intrapersonal or “self”-trust. Our challenge is to explain how there are
analogues of these interpersonal relations in the relations that you bear to yourself
as a single diachronically extended agent.
The first step toward meeting the challenge concedes a complexity in how you would
count as “betraying” your own trust. In an interpersonal case, the trustee can simply
betray the trustor’s trust – end of story. But it is unclear how there could be a com-
parably simple story in which an individual betrays his own trust. Can we say that the
individual is both the active “victimizer” and the passive “victim” of betrayed self-
trust? If he worries that he is being “victimized,” there is something he can do about
that – stop the “victimizing”! As we will see, this is precisely where the concept of
betrayed self-trust does its work: the subject worries that she is betraying her own self-
trust and responds by abandoning the judgment that invites the trust. When she aban-
dons the judgment, her worry about betrayal is thereby resolved. But the resolution
reveals something important about intrapersonal trust: that the subject resolves this
question of trust by responding to a worry, not about disappointed self-trust, but about
betrayed self-trust. The following series of cases reveals how it is in the context of such
a worry – and of such a resolution – that intrapersonal trust may figure as undi-
sappointed yet betrayed.
Consider first a standard case of akrasia:
Tempted voter. Ally is a firm supporter of political candidate X based on an
impartial assessment of X’s policies. She thereby judges that she has conclusive
reason to vote for X, rather than for X’s rival Y, and forms an intention to
vote accordingly. While waiting in line to vote, however, she overhears a con-
versation that reminds her how X’s policies will harm her personally, which in
turn creates a temptation to vote for Y. Despite still judging that she has con-
clusive reason to vote for X, the temptation “gets the better of her” and she
votes for Y. She almost immediately regrets her vote.
How should Ally have resolved this moment of akratic temptation? Her regret reveals
that she ought to have resolved the akrasia in a “downstream” direction: by letting the
judgment that she retains, even while tempted, guide her follow-through.8 Does she
betray her trust? We might think there is no intrapersonal trust here, since Ally fails to
act on her intention, but that would overlook how she has trusted her intention to vote
for X for weeks before election day. Imagine that she has campaigned for X, partly on
the basis of her intention to vote for X. She thereby treats her trustworthiness in
intending to vote for X as a reason to campaign for X – not as a sufficient reason unto
itself, but as one element in a set of reasons that, she judges, suffices for campaigning.
Simply put, if she had not intended to vote for X, she would not have regarded herself
as having sufficient reason to campaign for X. And she does betray her trust in herself
in that respect; she betrays her self-trust while also disappointing it.
We get one key contrast with a case that lacks this akratic element:
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Change of Mind. Amy arrives at the voting place judging that she has con-
clusive reason to vote for candidate X rather than the opposing candidate Y.
But while in line to vote, she overhears a discussion that re-opens her delib-
eration whether to vote for X. After confirming the accuracy of these new
considerations via a quick Internet search on her phone, Amy concludes that
she has conclusive reason to vote for Y instead of X and marks her ballot
accordingly.
Unlike Ally’s worry, Amy’s worry targets the deliberation informing her judgment. Ally
does not worry about her deliberation whether to vote for X; she remains confident
that she has decided the matter correctly – despite the fear of personal harm that gen-
erates her temptation to rebel against that judgment. But Amy does worry about her
deliberation: specifically, she worries that she may have made a misstep as she con-
ducted that deliberation, misassessing the considerations that she did assess (including
evidence, practical principles, or anything else that served as input to her deliberation),
or ignoring considerations available to her that she ought to have assessed. If, like Ally,
Amy has campaigned for X partly on the basis of her intention to vote for X, then she
disappoints her trust – but, unlike Ally, without betraying it. It is no betrayal if you fail
to execute an intention that you come to see you ought to abandon.
Consider now a case with this different normative structure:
Change of Heart. Annie, like Ally and Amy, arrives at the voting place judging
that she has conclusive reason to vote for X rather than Y. But while in line
she overhears a heartfelt tale of political conversion, wherein the speaker
recounts her struggles to overcome the preconceptions that led her earlier to
support candidates from X’s party. Annie recognizes herself in the speaker’s
struggles; she was likewise raised to support that party uncritically. She won-
ders how this political allegiance might lead to similar regret – but, even so,
the preconceptions are her preconceptions, and she finds it difficult to shake
them. Though shaken by the felt plausibility of the hypothesis that she is
untrustworthy, she continues to judge that she has conclusive reason to vote for
X. When her turn to vote arrives, she stares long and hard at the ballot, unsure
how to mark it.
Unlike Ally’s worry in Tempted Voter, Annie’s worry targets her judgment that she has
conclusive reason to vote for X. But unlike Amy’s worry in Change of Mind, Annie’s
worry does not target the deliberation informing her judgment – or, at least, not in the
way that Amy’s does. Annie does not worry that she has made a misstep as she con-
ducted that deliberation. She is perfectly willing to take at face value her confidence
that she has correctly assessed all the considerations that she did assess, and that she
did not ignore any consideration available to her that she ought to have assessed within
that deliberation. Her worry instead targets the “sense of” or “feeling for” what is at
stake for her in the deliberative context that informs how she is guided by this con-
fidence, her broader confidence not merely that she has correctly assessed everything
she did assess, among those considerations available to her, but that she has considered
matters well and fully enough to permit drawing a conclusion. She worries that her
feeling of conclusiveness – her sense that she has considered matters long enough and
well enough to justify this conclusion – may not be reliably responsive to what is really
at stake for her. Though she cannot shake this sense of the stakes, she worries that she
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ought to try harder to shake it. As long as she thereby retains the judgment without
letting it guide her, Annie counts as akratic. But her akrasia is crucially unlike Ally’s in
Tempted Voter. Whereas Ally betrays her trust while also disappointing it, Annie fears
she will betray her trust by failing to disappoint it. If the metaphor for Ally’s predica-
ment is weakness, the metaphor for Annie’s predicament is rigidity.
We might thus describe the phenomenological difference between the three cases. But
what are the core normative differences? The first difference is straightforward: Change
of Heart generates a second-order deliberation, whereas Change of Mind generates a
first-order deliberation. Here are two possible bases for the second-order deliberation in
Change of Heart: Annie may worry that impatience makes her hasty, or she may worry
that laziness makes her parochial. Whichever way we imagine it, the fundamental
target of Annie’s worry is her feeling for what is at stake: specifically, her sense of how
much time or energy she should devote to the deliberation informing her judgment.
Each addresses not her truth-conducive reliability but, to coin a term, her closure-con-
ducive reliability. She does not re-open her first-order deliberation as Amy does, by
suspending her earlier presumption that she is truth-conducively reliable about her
reasons. Unlike Amy, she continues to judge that she has conclusive reason to vote for
X. What Annie questions is whether to suspend her presumption of truth-conducive
reliability – that is, whether to re-open her first-order deliberation. In asking this
question, she suspends the presumption that she is closure-conducively reliable, the
presumption that informs her sense that she is entitled to treat that first-order delib-
eration as closed.
How does Annie undertake this higher-order species of reflection? What is it to
question one’s own closure-conducive reliability? This leads us to the second normative
difference between Change of Heart and Change of Mind. How could Annie adopt a
mistrustful higher-order perspective on whether to trust her own first-order deliberative
perspective?
11.3 How the Prospect of Betrayed Self-Trust Plays Its Normative Role
Annie’s higher-order perspective on her first-order judgment projects a broader future
for her, insofar as it crucially involves an attitude toward her own future regret. Unlike
reflection on her truth-conducive reliability, reflection on her closure-conducive relia-
bility represents her agency as extending not merely to the time of action but out to the
horizon that Michael Bratman calls plan’s end, the point beyond which she will no
longer think about the action.9
We can codify this forward-looking reflection as follows. When Annie judges that she
has conclusive reason to vote for X, she projects a future, out beyond election day, in
which:
(Down) (a) she will not regret having voted for X, and
(b) she will regret not having voted for X.
But when Annie worries about the trustworthiness of this judgment, thereby deliberat-
ing whether to redeliberate, she projects a future, out beyond election day, in which:
(Up) (a) she will regret having voted for X, and
(b) she will not regret not having voted for X.
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I have labeled the projection that emerges from the perspective of judgment “Down”
because it points downstream: Annie will have nothing to regret if she trustingly
commits herself to this judgment and then acts on the commitment. This is how Ally
struggles with temptation: her viewing it as “temptation” rather than an occasion to
change her mind derives from the downstream-pointing projection of her judgment.
She believes that she will regret giving in to the “temptation” because she expects that
it will amount to a merely transient preference reversal. By contrast, I have labeled
the projection that emerges from Annie’s mistrust in her judgment ‘Up’ because it
points upstream: she will regret it if she lets herself be thus influenced by her judg-
ment, and she will not regret it if she does not let herself be thus influenced. This
regret does not mark a merely transient preference reversal within the projection but
expresses her settled attitude toward the self-relation that she manifests in thus fol-
lowing her judgment.
Why should the concept of regret play this role in structuring the two projections?
Here is my hypothesis: regret plays this normative role as the intrapsychic manifestation
of betrayed self-trust. As others have emphasized,10 betrayal finds its natural expression
in reactive attitudes, engendering contempt or resentment in the betrayed toward the
betrayer. If regret functions as an intrapersonal reactive attitude, that enables the concept
of betrayed trust to shape self-governance in prospect, as referring not to something
actual but to something to be kept non-actual – on pain of regret. It could not play this
role if it – that is, betrayed self-trust experienced as regret that you trusted your judg-
ment – were not something with which we are familiar in ordinary experience. Such
regret is common in two sorts of case, in each of which the subject is concerned for her
intrapersonal rational coherence, not merely for her welfare.11
First, we do sometimes make bad choices that we regret in this way. “What could I
have been thinking?” you ask yourself at plan’s end, appalled that you trusted a judg-
ment that now seems manifestly unworthy of your trust. This experience is crucially
unlike merely being displeased by the results of following through on a judgment. You
may well be displeased with the results of trusting your judgment yet not regret the self-
influence as such. You may think you did your best to avoid error yet fell into error
anyway. Or you may temper your self-criticism with the thought that no evidence of
your own untrustworthiness – including your closure-conducive unreliability – was then
available to you. If there was no evidence of untrustworthiness available to you when
you trusted, then your trust was not unreasonable, however displeased you may be with
the results. In an alternative case, however, you may think that there was evidence of
your own untrustworthiness available, and that you trustingly followed through on your
judgment through incompetence in weighing that evidence. That case motivates a
deeper form of regret that targets your self-relations more directly.
Here then is the second source of everyday familiarity with betrayed self-trust. As we
mature, we do much that we wind up regretting in this way: you judge that you have
conclusive reason to φ, trust that judgment because you are too immature to weigh
available evidence of your untrustworthiness, then later realize your mistake. Your
question is not: “What could I have been thinking?” It is all too clear how immaturity
led you to deliberative error. One of our developmental aims is to learn to make judg-
ments that will prove genuinely authoritative for us.
How might Annie’s judgment fail to be authoritative? Here, again, is my answer:
she fears that her judgment will, looking back, appear to have betrayed her own trust.
The answer presents the case in all its diachronic complexity, wherein the subject
looks ahead not merely to the time of action but all the way out to “plan’s end.”
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Annie fears that the deliberative perspective informing her judgment does not man-
ifest the right responsiveness to her ongoing – and possibly changing – needs. When
she reasons “upstream,” she aims to feel the force of these needs from plan’s end, by
projecting a retrospect from which she would feel relevant regret.12 We thus return to
the idea from which we began: though reactive attitudes are the key to distinguishing
trust from mere reliance, they need not be moral. Our focus on reactive attitudes
reveals not their moral but their rational force: they target the subject’s rational
authority and coherence. Annie’s projection out to plan’s end serves as a reactive-
attitudinal retrospect on her planning agency, not because it represents her as plan-
ning through that entire interval, but because it represents her as having settled the
question of her needs in more local planning. The local planning that informs her
voting behavior, with its implications for broader planning, requires that she view her
judgments as rationally adequate to that exercise of self-governance. And her reac-
tive-attitudinal stance from plan’s end settles whether her judgments were indeed thus
adequate insofar as they avoided self-betrayal in the way they presumed. Her self-
mistrustful attitude in the voting booth both projects this verdict and uses the verdict
as a basis for assessing the presumption.
When you reason “upstream” – abandoning your judgment because you mistrust it –
you show responsiveness to the possibility of betrayed self-trust. Such self-mistrust does
not entail betrayed self-trust, since it is possible that you do care appropriately about
what is at stake for you in your deliberative context and therefore that your self-mis-
trust is mistaken. But it is possible that your self-mistrust is not mistaken: perhaps you
really have betrayed the invited self-trust relation. The responsiveness at the core of
trust is a rational responsiveness because it targets the possibility that your trust in this
would-be source of rationality has been betrayed.
11.4 Inviting Others to Trust at Will
How does this intrapersonal normative dynamic run in parallel with an interpersonal
dynamic? The intrapersonal dynamic unfolds between perspectives within the agency of
a single person, as the person acts on an aim to bring those perspectives into rational
coherence. The interpersonal dynamic, by contrast, engages two people with entirely
separate perspectives that cannot, without pathology, enter into anything like that
coherence relation. Interpersonal trust must therefore engage an alternative rational
norm – but what norm? It helps to reflect on a parallel between intending and pro-
mising: just as you invite your own trust when you form an intention to φ, so you invite
the trust of a promisee when you promise him that you will φ. In neither case does the
invitation merely prompt the invitee to respond to evidence of your reliability in
undertaking the intention or promise. In each case, you aim that the recipient of your
invitation should trust you and feel rationally entitled to express that trust through
action – following through on your intention in the first case, performing acts that
depend on your keeping your promise in the second – even in the absence of sufficient
evidence that you are worthy of the trust, as long as there is no good evidence that you
are unworthy of it. And we can make similar remarks about other forms of inter-
personal assurance – say, testimony and advice. The parallel reveals something impor-
tant about the value of a capacity to trust at will. Both intrapersonally and
interpersonally, a capacity for voluntary trust makes us susceptible to rational inter-




As in the intrapersonal case, the rational influence unfolds through two importantly
different perspectives. Take first the perspective of the addressee, and consider the value
in trusting others, beyond merely relying on your own judgment that another is rele-
vantly reliable. If someone invites your trust by offering you testimony, advice, or a
promise, and evidence is available that the person is relevantly reliable, you can judge
that she is reliable on the basis of that evidence and on that basis believe what
she testifies, or do what she advises, or count on her to keep her promise – on the basis,
that is, of your evidentially grounded judgment that she will prove to be or have been
relevantly reliable. But what if no such evidence is available? Or what if, though the
evidence is available, there is insufficient time to assess it? Or what if she would regard
your seeking and assessing evidence of her worthiness of your trust as a slight – as a
sheer refusal of her invitation to trust? You might on one of these bases deem it pre-
ferable to trust without seeking evidence of her worthiness of your trust – as long as
you can count on your capacity to withhold trust should evidence of her unworthiness
of your trust become available. Here again we see why it might prove a source of value
to be capable of trusting at will. Though you could not trust if there were evidence that
the would-be trustee is unworthy of your trust, if there is no such evidence you can
decide to trust merely by disposing yourself to do so.
Is this a moral value inhering in the value of the trust relation? As in the intra-
personal case, that over-moralizes trust. Say, after asking directions, you trust the tes-
timony or advice of a stranger on the street. Or say you trust your neighbor’s promise
to “save your spot” in a queue. Do you thereby create moral value? Moral value seems
principally to arise on the trustee’s side, through whatever it takes to vindicate your
trust. Setting morality aside, a different species of value can arise on your side of the
relation. Assuming the trustee relevantly reliable, you can acquire a reason that you
might not otherwise have – a reason to believe her testimony, the follow her advice or
to perform actions that depend on her keeping her promise. This reason is grounded
partly in the trustee’s reliability and partly in the (counterfactual) sensitivity to evidence
of the trustee’s unreliability that informs your trust: if you have (or had) such evidence
you would cease trusting (or would not have trusted). The latter ground marks the
difference between a reason acquired through trust and a reason acquired through mere
reliance. Sometimes you cannot trust a person on whom you rely, because evidence of
her unreliability forces you to rely, not directly on her, but on your own judgment that
relying on her is nonetheless reasonable. But when you lack such evidence you can get
the reason by choosing to trust her – even if you have evidence that would justify
relying on her without trust.
How could a reason be grounded even partly in your trusting sensitivity to evidence
of the trustee’s unworthiness of your trust? The key lies in understanding how the
illocutionary norms informing testimony, advice and promising codify your risk of
betrayal. The normative basis of your risk of disappointment lies in your own judg-
ment: you judge that the evidence supports reliance that would incur this risk, so the
responsibility for the risk itself lies narrowly on your side – whatever else we may say
about responsibility for the harms of disappointing your reliance. When you trust,
however, responsibility for the risk of betrayal you thereby undergo is normatively
distributed across the invited trust relation. What explains this distribution? In the
cases of assurance at issue, you trust by accepting the invitation that informs the
trustee’s assurance, which is informed by the trustee’s understanding of how that
response risks betrayal. You thus respond to the trustee’s normative acceptance of
responsibility for that risk – something that has no parallel in mere reliance. You can
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trust “at will” because you can choose to let yourself be governed by the trustee’s
normative acceptance of responsibility for how you are governed, an exercise of will
that may give you access to reasons to do or believe things that you would not
otherwise have reason to do or believe, but at the cost of undergoing the risk that this
trustee will betray you, When I say that the trustee accepts “normative” responsi-
bility, I mean that she thereby commits herself to abiding by the norms that codify
that responsibility. If she is insincere, she flouts those norms and in that respect does
not even attempt to live up to the responsibility she thereby incurs. This is one prin-
cipal respect in which your trust risks betrayal.
The normative nature of this exchange emerges more fully from the other side. When
you offer testimony, advice or a promise, do you merely “put your speech act out
there,” aiming to get hearers to rely on you for whatever reasons the evidence available
to those hearers can support? If that were your aim, your testimony would not differ
from a mere assertion, your advice would not differ from a mere assertion about your
hearer’s reasons, and your promise would not differ from a mere assertion of intention.
What is missing in these alternative acts is the distinctive way in which you address
your testimony, advice or promise: you invite your addressee’s trust. In inviting his
trust, you engage your addressee’s responsiveness to evidence of your unworthiness of
his trust, and thereby to the possibility that his trust might be betrayed. But you more
fundamentally engage your addressee’s capability to draw this distinction in his will: to
trust you instead of merely relying on you through an appreciation of positive evidence
that you are reliable. If he can do the first, then he can also do the second – perhaps
irrationally (if there is insufficient evidence that you are reliable). Why should he trust?
The simplest answer is that that is what you have invited him to do. In issuing that
invitation, you aim at this very exercise of will – that he should trust you at will. You
take responsibility for the reason you thereby give him (assuming you reliable) by
inviting him to rely on your normative acceptance of responsibility for the wrongful-
ness of betraying the trust you thereby invite.
What if you do not believe that you can engage your addressee’s capacity for trust,
because you believe that there is good evidence available to this addressee that you are
not worthy of it?13 You thereby confront an issue that you can attempt to resolve in
either of two ways. You can attempt to counter the appearance that this evidence of
your untrustworthiness is good evidence, thereby defusing its power over your addres-
see’s capacity to trust you. Or you can shift to the alternative act, attempting instead to
get your addressee to rely on you for reasons of his own – including perhaps a reason
grounded in evidence that you are, on balance, relevantly reliable. On this second
strategy, you now longer invite the addressee’s trust. The only way to invite his trust –
without insincerity or some other normative failure – is to counter the appearance that
you are unworthy of it. You must counter this appearance because without doing so
you cannot believe that your addressee will enter freely – “at will” – into this trust
relation, by accepting your invitation, not by responding to positive evidence of your
reliability but by relying on you in the way distinctive of trust. In inviting trust, you aim
at willed trust.
By this different route we again contrast the intimacy of trust with a form of alie-
nation. In intrapersonal and intrapersonal cases alike, governance through trust con-
trasts with an alienated relation mediated by evidence. To the worry that an emphasis
on betrayal over-moralizes trust, I reply that the norms informing each relation are
rational, not moral. Appreciating the rational force of the trustee’s invitation to trust
helps us grasp the parallel species of intimacy at stake in the intrapersonal relation. As
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a self-governing agent, each of us sometimes encounters Annie’s predicament in
Change of Heart: she fears that follow-through on her voting intention may amount to
self-betrayal. In that worst-case scenario for her rational agency, as she followed
through she would manifest trust in her intending self but betray that trust by not
having adequately served, in the judgment that informs her intention, the needs of her
acting self – as she will learn when she regrets from plan’s end. You run that risk
whenever you follow through on an intention: you risk betrayal by your own practical
judgment. Like Annie, you can address the risk by being open to a change of heart.
But every time you form an intention you are already like Annie in this respect: you are
responsive to the possibility that you ought to undergo such a change of heart, and you
aim to avoid that possibility. Your aim as you commit yourself looking downstream
thus acknowledges not merely the psychological but also the normative force of
upstream-looking self-mistrust. As you judge or intend, you thereby acknowledge the
normative bearing of your capacity to trust at will.14
Notes
1 Self-trust has been a topic in recent epistemology (e.g. Foley 2001 and Zagzebski 2012) and in dis-
cussion of the moral value of autonomy (e.g. McLeod 2002). My angle on self-trust is different: I
am interested in its role in action through time, without any specifically moral emphasis.
2 Nothing in what follows turns on any difference between trustworthiness and reliability: by
“reliability” I mean the core of what would make you worthy of trust.
3 For the view that trust is constituted by a commitment (by a commitment-constituting answer
to a question), see Hieronymi (2008) and McMyler (2017). For more general treatments of
“commitment-constituted attitudes,” see Hieronymi (2005, 2009).
4 For more on this, see Watson (2003).
5 To cover trust in testimony or advice, we can modify this to include the trustee’s not being as
you trust her to be (viz. reliable in relevant respects).
6 Many philosophers join me in holding that trust distinctively risks not mere disappointment but
betrayal. See, e.g. Baier (1994: chapters 6–9); Holton (1994); Jones (1996, 2004); Walker (2006:
chapter 3); Hieronymi (2008); McGeer (2008); McMyler (2011: chapter 4); and Hawley (2014).
7 For example, Hardin (2002: chapter 3); Nickel (2007: section 6); and Rose (2011: chapter 9).
8 I take the “stream” metaphor from Kolodny (2005: e.g. 529).
9 Bratman (1998, 2014). Though I am indebted to Bratman for the idea that projected regret is
crucial to the stability of intention, in Hinchman (2010, 2015, 2016) I dissent from some details
in how he develops it.
10 See note 3 above, especially Holton (1994).
11 One background issue: does your capacity to serve as a source of rationality for your future self
license illicit bootstrapping, whereby you get bumped into a rational status “for free” merely by
forming an intention? For developments of this worry, see Bratman (1987:23–27, 86–87); and
Broome (2001). Smith (2016) offers a dissenting perspective. I treat the issue in Hinchman
(2003, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2017: sections II and IV). For present purposes, it does not strictly
matter how I reply to the bootstrapping challenge, both because my present argument could
work in conjunction with the weaker view that we operate under an (“error-theoretic”) fiction
that we can give ourselves the rational status (following Kolodny 2005: section 5) and because
my core claim is not that a trustworthy intention to φ gives you a reason to φ (which does look
like bootstrapping) but that it (a) gives you “planning reasons” to do other things – things that
you would not have sufficient reason to do if you were not trustworthy in intending to φ – and
(b) more generally serves as a source of rational coherence.
12 I offer a much fuller defense of upstream reasoning (replying to the objections in Kolodny
(2005), 528–539) in Hinchman (2013: section 3). The most fundamental challenge lies in
explaining how it is possible for you to judge that you ought to φ while also mistrusting that
judgment. If this is impossible, then reasoning must always point “downstream,” since mis-
trusting a judgment would simply amount to abandoning it.
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13 This is not precisely the question of “therapeutic trust” (see e.g. Horsburgh 1960; Holton 1994;
Jones 2004; McGeer 2008). But it raises a question about whether you can invite therapeutic
trust.
14 Thanks to Ben McMyler, Philip Nickel, and Judith Simon for stimulating comments on an
earlier draft. I develop this view of intrapersonal trust more fully in Hinchman (2003, 2009,
2010, 2016). And I develop this view of interpersonal trust more fully in Hinchman (2005, 2014,
2017 and forthcoming).
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